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RECENT CASES
CONFLICT OF LAWS-JURISDICTION-ASSUMPTION OF
PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER NON-RESIDENT INSURER
ON THE BASIS OF A SINGLE INSURANCE CONTRACT
In a suit by the beneficiary of a life insurance policy, a California

court assumed personal jurisdiction over the Texas insurer under an
unauthorized insurer statute,' and a default judgment was rendered
for the beneficiary. The insurer had no office or agent in California
and had never solicited or done any business therein apart from mailing this single contract to the insured resident therein and receiving
premiums in payment therefor. 2 The California judgment being unsatisfied, its enforcement was denied in the Texas courts on the ground
that such assumption of personal jurisdiction by California constituted
a denial of due process. 3 On certiorari to the Supreme Court of the
United States, held, reversed. The mailing of a single insurance contract into a state and receipt of premiums therefor creates such a
"substantial connection" with that state as to render a non-resident
insurer amenable to statutes granting personal jurisdiction without
1. CAL. INS. CODE ANN., §§ 1610-20 (Deering 1950). California's Unauthorized
Insurers Process Act was enacted in 1949. Pertinent provisions hold to the

effect that any of the following acts, when effected in this state, by mail or
otherwise, by a non-admitted insurer, is equivalent to and shall constitute an
appointment by such insurer of the California Insurance Commissioner as
agent upon whom may be served process:
"(1) The issuance or delivery to residents of ... this State of contracts
of insurance insuring (a) the lives of persons or residents of this State
physically present herein at the time of such issuance or delivery ....
"(2) The solicitation of applications for such contracts.
"(3) The collection of premiums, membership fees, assessments or
other considerations for such contracts.
"(4) Any other transaction of business arising out of such contracts."
2. This contract was actually a reinsurance contract. Respondent, in assuming Empire Mutual's insurance obligations, mailed an offer to this effect to
the insured who accepted by mail. Both Empire Mutual and respondent were
non-admitted insurers, neither having ever had any officer or agents in California. 355 U.S. at 221-22.
3. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 288 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. Civ. App.
1956). This opinion does not challenge the validity of substituted service of
process under the California statute, but bases its ruling on the single fact
that the policy sued on in the California court was in force prior to the effective date of the Unauthorized Insurers Process Act of that state. The court
relied heavily on Parmalee v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 206 F.2d 518
(5th Cir. 1953) involving a Florida statute similar in all material respects.
"Furthermore, as a regulatory law it plainly can be given no effect which will
impose, retroactively, the provisions of the statute upon unauthorized insurers
having policies in force prior to the enactment of the statute. These distinctions are not hypothetical, but are substantial, in the proper application of
the statute. They mark the line between due process and unauthorized state
action." Parmalee v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, supra at 523 (dictum).
1437
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violating due process. McGee v. InternationalLife Ins. Co., 355 U.S.
220 (1957).
Since Pennoyer v. Neff, 4 courts have frequently found exceptions to
the requirement that actual presence is necessary to support personal
jurisdiction over a non-resident. This has been accomplished through
two rationales. 5 As to corporations, jurisdictional power generally has
been acquired through statutes 6 founded upon systematic business
7
activities within the state. In satisfying due process objections to
such statutes, several overlapping conceptualistic theories were advanced. The "consent" theory grew out of a state's power to exclude
non-resident corporations from doing business locally, thus giving rise
to the correlative power to require of such corporations, as a condition
for admission, the appointment of an agent, or consent to appointment
of a state official as agent, for service of process. 8 Use was also made
of the "presence" test, whereby jurisdiction attached if a corporation's
business activities within the state were of such nature and extent as
to warrant an inference that it was "present" therein.9 On the other
hand, further expansion of jurisdiction over non-residents arose in a
line of cases founded on a theory entirely distinct from the "doing
business" rationale applicable to corporations. First applied to individuals, but no longer so limited, these cases involve those single
acts of non-residents committed within the state which are inherently
dangerous to the health and safety of its citizenry.10 The use of state
police power as source for this new assumption of jurisdiction rapidly
became accepted throughout the United States.
4. 95 U.S. 714 (1877) (actual presence or voluntary appearance of nonresident essential to binding personal judgment).
5. For thorough treatment of the development of these two approaches see
Note, 4 VAND. L. REV. 661 (1951); Note, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 381 (1955); Note,
43 VA. L. REV. 1105 (1957).
6. That the existence of statutory authorization is essential to the extension
of state jurisdiction over any non-resident corporation, see City Fire Ins. Co.
v. Carruge, 41 Ga. 660 (1871); Rothrack v. Dwelling-House Ins. Co., 161 Mass.
423, 37 N.E. 206 (1894); Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 416 (1955).

7. See Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 416, 421 (1955).
8. Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1856); Isaacs, An

Analysis of Doing Business, 25 CoLum. L. REv. 1018, 1032 (1925).

For a finding

of implied consent where no actual consent was given see Old Wayne Mut.
Life Ass'n v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8 (1907); Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Spratley, 172 U.S. 602 (1899). One patent defect in the consent theory is its
theoretical inapplicability to corporations engaged in interstate commerce,
which a state does not have power to exclude.
9. People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79 (1918);
Philadelphia & Reading Ry. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917).

10. The non-resident motorist statutes have been upheld as a reasonable
extension of a state's police power to protect its citizenry from instrumentalities dangerous to health and safety. See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352
(1927); Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916); Scott, Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Motorists, 39 HARV. L. REV. 563 (1926); Note, 25 COLUM. L. REV. 204
(1925). Similarly, as to threat of potential financial harm, see Travelers
Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950); Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294,
U.S. 623 (1935).
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The resultant limitations on and strict interpretations of the "doing
business" guides" inhibited achievement of a consistent standard in
extending jurisdiction over non-resident corporations and led to the
abandonment of these theories in International Shoe Co. v. State of
2
Washington.1
Under the test expressed there, a non-resident corporation would be amenable to jurisdiction if found to have certain minimum contacts with the state sufficient to satisfy "traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice."'13 Although the International Shoe
doctrine has been criticized for vagueness, 14 the opinion's broad policy
statements 5 suggested that more consistent fairness would be accomplished by merging in each case both the "doing business" and "single
act" approaches, with "reasonableness" as the essential predicate.'6
Perhaps the most striking example of this fusion of theories occurs in
cases dealing with unauthorized insurer statutes. Since the insurance
business creates an exceptional area of risk to the public, it would
seem to be peculiarly susceptible to the single act rationale. 17 The
specified acts 18 making non-resident insurers amenable to jurisdiction
under these statutes seem to corroborate this view. But it is no answer
to say that the court in the instant case has merely included insurance
within the police power concept that embraces non-resident motorists
11. Minnesota Commercial Men's Ass'n v. Benn, 261 U.S. 140 (1923) (contracting by mail insufficient to render foreign insurer amenable to state
jurisdiction); Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923)
(single or occasional acts not enough to constitute corporate presence);
Green v. Chicago B & Q. Ry., 204 U.S. 530 (1907) (mere solicitations insufficient to justify assertion of jurisdiction); Old Wayne Mut. Life Ass'n v.
McDonough, 204 U.S. 8 (1907) (implied consent limited to causes of action
arising out of business transacted within the state). For broad treatment of
these various guides to non-resident jurisdiction, see Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 416
(1955); Note, 4 VAM. L. REV. 661 (1951); Note, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 381 (1955).
12. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
13. Id. at 316.

14. McBaine, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations: Actions Arising Out

of Acts Done Within the Forum, 34 CALIF. L. REV. 331, 336 (1946).
15. "Finally, although the commission of some single or occasional acts
of the corporate agent in a state sufficient to impose an obligation or liability
on the corporation has not been thought to confer upon the state authority to
enforce it, Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516, other
such acts, because of their nature and quality and the circumstances of their
commission, may be deemed sufficient to render the corporation liable to
suit." Supra note 12 at 318. "The test is not merely . . . whether the activity,
which the corporation has seen fit to procure through its agents in another
state, is a little more or a little less.... Whether due process is satisfied must
depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the
fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the
due process clause to insure." Supra note 12 at 319.
16. Id. at 320. Such reasonableness must come from a balancing of the
state's interest in assuming jurisdiction in return for protection extended to
the corporation, against the inconveniences which would result to the corporation from a trial in the distant state. For the origin of this estimate of the
inconveniences, see Judge Learned Hand's opinion in Hutchinson v. Chase &

Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1930).

17. See Doherty v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935) (use of police power to
protect against particularly threatening types of economic loss, i.e., securities).
18. See note 1 supra.
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and dealers in securities. 19 The opinion gives no indication that its
reasoning is to be restricted to the insurance business. Moreover, the
court's discussion of the expansion of personal jurisdiction due to the
increasingly national character of commerce and the corresponding
development of transportation and communication media strongly
20
suggests a general expansion of International Shoe.
While this case is in line with developments in other recent decisions, 21 it is felt that the candor with which the unanimous court finds
due process satisfied by a single contract indicates a stretching of the
"reasonableness" concept implicit in InternationalShoe and the possible abandonment of the limitations suggested in that decision.22 From
the instant case, it appears that henceforth nothing more than the
barest economic activity need be shown to constitutionally justify the
asserted jurisdiction over non-residents. This expansion can be expected to stimulate broadened legislation among all the states, and it
will be interesting to see where the Supreme Court will draw the
line.2

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TAXATION-TAX IMMUNITY OF
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT NOT INFRINGED BY LOCAL
TAXES UPON POSSESSION OF GOVERMENT PROPERTY
Respondent Murray Corporation, sub-contractor under a prime
contract for the manufacture of airplane parts for the United States,
19. See note 10 supra.
20. 355 U.S. at 222-23.
21. For two lower court decisions which go even further on their facts
than does the instant case, see Schutt v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Acc. Ass'n,
229 F.2d 158 (2d Cir. 1956) (defendant New York insurance company issued
policy to a Kentucky resident who later moved to Tennessee where jurisdiction over defendant was upheld although defendant had no property, office,

or employees in that state); Zacharakis v. Bunker Hill Mut. Ins. Co., 281
App. Div. 487, 120 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1st Dep't 1953) (Pennsylvania insurer held
amenable to New York jurisdiction although defendant's only contact with
that state was mailing to a New York resident a policy which insured property
in New Hampshire and receiving premium in return).
22. Certain language in the opinion seems to cut away at Judge Hand's rationale of estimating the inconvenience (noted in note 17 supra) by suggesting that any economic activity justifies virtually any inconvenience. 355
U.S. at 222-23. Also the court does not concern itself with any consideration
of a systematic activity or single act but cites cases intermingled from both
lines of approach.
23. For a more recent far-reaching opinion based on the authority of the
instant case, see Pugh v. Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 159 F. Supp.
155 (E.D. La. 1958). But see Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) wherein
the Supreme Court indicates there is still some force in the Pennoyer v. Neff
doctrine. This recent opinion is particularly helpful in showing that McGee is
not limited to the insurance field, for although the court denied jurisdiction
over the non-resident, it did so over the full strength of McGee, without distinguishing or limiting it to its facts.
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was taxed' upon personalty acquired for performance of the subcontract by both city and county authorities. Title to the property
assessed had passed to the United States.2 Murray paid under protest
and brought suit to recover the taxes. The United States intervened
claiming title to the property. The district court held that the property
had been improperly subjected to the tax and the court of appeals
affirmed. On certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, held,
reversed. The constitutional right to tax immunity of the federal
government is not infringed by local taxes the incidence of which
fall up on the possession of government property. City of Detroit v.
Murray Corp., 355 U.S. 489 (1958).
The doctrine of tax immunity of the federal government had its
origin in the landmark case of McCulloch v. Maryland3 and continued
unbroken for a little more than one hundred years. 4 A significant
1. Both the City of Detroit and the County of Wayne assessed a tax against
Murray based on the value of the materials and the work in process in its
possession to which the United States held title. The pertinent statutory
provisions are MhcH. STAT. ANN., §§ 7.1, 7.10, 7.81 (1950); MIcH. CoMP. LAws

§§ 211.1, 211.10, 211.40 (1948); Tit. VI, c. II, § 1 and Tit. VI, c. IV, §§ 1, 7,
26, 27, of the Charter of the City of Detroit. They provide in effect that the
owners or persons in possession of any personal property shall pay all taxes
assessed thereon.
2. The sub-contract provided that on the making of any partial payments
to Murray "title to all parts, materials, inventories, work in process and
non durable tools theretofore (and thereafter, upon acquisition) acquired or
produced by the sub-contractor for the performance of the contract(s), and
properly thereto ...

shall forthwith vest in the government."

3. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 435 (1819). "The states have no power by taxation or otherwise to retard, impede, burden or in any manner control, the
operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the general government. This is, we think, the
unavoidable consequence of that supremacy which the constitution has declared."
4. A series of cases during this period demonstrates how firmly entrenched
the doctrine of governmental immunity had become. A state may not tax an
instrumentality of the United States, Osborne v. Bank of United States, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). In Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie County,
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 435 (1842), the Supreme Court prohibited an attempt by
Erie County to assess the captain of a United States revenue cutter with an
income tax. The Court held that Pennsylvania had no constitutional right
either directly or indirectly to levy such a tax. Some forty years later an
attempt by Texas to levy such a tax on telegraph companies within its borders
was invalidated by the Supreme Court, Telegraph Company v. Texas, 105
U.S. 460 (1882). Western Union contended that the tax as it applied to the
transmission of government messages was placed on an agency selected by
the government to exercise its powers. The Court agreed, saying that it
amounted to a tax by the state on the means employed by the government to
exercise its constitutional powers and was therefore void. Perhaps the high
water mark of the concept of governmental immunity was reached in the
case of Williams v. City of Talladega, 226 U.S. 404 (1912). Talladega, Alabama
had a municipal ordinance which required that each person, firm, or corporation commercially engaged in business sending messages to and from the
city to and from points Alabama obtain a $100.00 license. The agent for
Western Union was convicted of operating without a license. The agents
claimed the ordinance was void as it made no exception to the sending of
government messages. The Supreme Court agreed, stating that "the ordinance,
making no exception of this class of business, necessarily includes its transac-
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narrowing of this concept occurred in 1937 when the Supreme Court
of the United States upheld a gross receipts tax upon a contractor
engaged in federal construction, because it placed no direct burden
on the government, 5 the concept of immunity shifting from a concern
with where the economic burden fell 6 to a concern with where the
legal incidence of the tax fell.7 Although the ultimate financial burden
may rest on the government under either test, a state or local taxing
authority may not tax a private party if the legal incidence of the
tax falls directly on the government; 8 otherwise, the tax will be
upheld.9
Although the tax levied on Murray in the instant case was called
a personal property tax, the Court was of the opinion that this was
not determinative, stating: "We must look through form and behind
labels to substance."'10 It then examined the tax and found it to
represent a levy on a private party possessing government property
which it was using or processing in the course of its own business.
The Court concluded that under such circumstances nothing bars a
state from taxing possession. To support its conclusion the Court
turned to Esso Standard Oil v. Evans," stating that a tax on possession
tions within the privilege tax levied. This part of the license exacted necessarily affects the whole, and makes the tax unconstitutional and void." 226
U.S. at 419.
5. James v. Dravo Contracting Company, 302 U.S. 134 (1937). West Virginia sought to apply its gross receipts tax to a contractor engaged in federal
construction; the taxpayer attempted to restrain its collection. The tax was
upheld by a five to four decision. Speaking for the majority, Chief Justice
Hughes said the tax was not laid on the government, its property, its officers,
or contract, but on an independent contractor and thus constituted no direct
burden on the government.
6. Ibid.

7. Alabama v. King and Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941). The tax was levied
against the seller but by its terms required to be passed on to the purchaser.
The seller, a lumber company, sold to contractors to use in the construction of
an army base. By the terms of the construction contract, title to the materials
passed to the government on delivery and the government was to reimburse
the contractor for specified expenses including expenditures for all supplies
and materials and state or local taxes which the contractor was required to
pay. The Supreme Court, using the legal incidence test, upheld the tax.
8. Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110 (1954). A contractor had
a contract to construct a naval ammunition depot. By the terms of the contract, the United States agreed to reimburse the contractor for any state taxes
it was required to pay, and further the contractor became the purchasing
agent for the United States with title to the materials and equipment passing
directly from the vendor to the United States. The contractor was to make
payments for the material and be reimbursed by the government. The contractor bought two tractors for use on the job from Kern-Limerick. The
Arkansas sales tax on the vendor was required to be passed on to the
purchaser. The Supreme Court used the legal incidence test to strike down
the Arkansas tax, by emphasizing the form of the contract entered into which
allowed the contractor to claim immunity as an agent of the United States.
9. Alabama v. King and Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941).
10. Instant case at 489.
11. 345 U.S. 495 (1953). There the Supreme Court upheld a state tax which
was levied on the storage of government owned fuel. The rationale of the
Court was that it was on the privilege of storing property and not on the
property itself.
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was not intrinsically different from a tax on storage where in both
instances the private party holds the property for its own benefit.
Murray had relied on United States v. Allegheny County,'2 which held
that a state did not have the power to tax the property of the United
States. The Court distinguished that case on the grounds that there
was no attempt to segregate and tax the taxpayer's interest while in
the instant case the taxing authorities were careful not to tax the
government's interest in the property. As a means of further distinguishing Allegheny, the Court pointed out that in that case it did
not decide whether a state could tax a private party for the use and
possession of government property.
The question of whether the immunity of the federal government
is to be extended to a federal contractor has become a problem of
increasing importance since the federal government is the largest
purchaser in the United States. The focal point of whatever type of
tax a state seeks to impose appears to be who has to bear the initial
burden; or, to borrow a phrase from the late Thomas Reed Powell, the
test is apparently not "who is hurt, but who is hit."'1 3 There is much
to be said both for and against immunity.14 It must be stated however
that such immunity serves to relieve the federal government of large
additional expenditures while at the same time depriving the states
of much needed sources of revenue.

EVIDENCE-HEARSAY-UTTERANCE OF EMPLOYEE
UNDER EMOTIONAL STRESS ADMISSIBLE TO ESTABLISH
SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT AND RENDER
EMPLOYER VICARIOUSLY LIABLE
In an action against an employer to recover vicariously for personal
injuries sustained by a pedestrian as a result of an employee's negligent operation of his own car after working hours, an oral statement
allegedly made by the employee was offered in evidence to show that
he was engaged in his employer's business at the time of the accident.
12. 322 U.S. 174 (1944). In this case the County of Allegheny levied an
ad valorem general property tax on machinery owned by the United States
but leased to Mesta Machine Company for use by the latter in connection
with a federal contract. The tax was on the entire value of the property, not
simply the lessee's interest. The Court held that "the Government's property
interests are not taxable either to it or to its bailee." 322 U.S. at 187.
13. POWELL, VAGARIES AND VARIETIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, 141
(1956).
14. See Miller, State Power Over The Federal Contractor: A

Problem In,

Federalism, 11 VANi. L. REv. 175 (1957); Rice and Estes, Sales and Use Taxes
As Affected By Federal Governmental Immunity, 9 VAND.L. REV. 204 (1956);
Sanders, Constitutional Law-953 Tennessee Survey, 6 VAiD. L. REV. 1159,
(1953).
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Although it was urged that an agent's declaration concerning his authority is inadmissible as against his employer, and, that excited utterances are-only admissible to explain the exciting occurrence, the statement was admitted; and the jury found the employee to have been
within the scope of his employment when the accident occurred.
On defendant's appeal from an adverse judgment, held, affirmed. An
employee's out-of-court utterance made under emotional stress which
shows that while using his own car after regular working hours he
was in fact acting for his employer, is admissible to establish an act
within the scope of employment and result in the vicarious liability of
the employer. Murphy Auto Parts Co. v. Ball, 249 F.2d 508 (D.C. Cir.
1957).
An agent's declarations as to the scope of his employment are usually
not admissible in evidence against the principal unless the agent has
been authorized to speak in his principal's behalf.' Such declarations
are admissible, however, if they come within some other exception to
the hearsay rule.2 Most courts admit relevant hearsay statements
which are uttered spontaneously3 in connection with an exciting event
which is the subject of the declaration. 4 The stress of nervous excitement produced by the exciting event is said to provide the guaranty
of the declarant's sincerity and thus negatives the probability of his
contriving anything to his advantage. 5 An older view generally rejected at present,6 is that of Thayer, in which the primary requirement for admission is "contemporaneousness." 7 Under this theory, in
§ 95 (4th ed. 1952).
2. See MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 14 (1954).
3. By spontaneous the courts mean ". . . an act so dominated by considerations external to the self, that rational thought or personal will plays no part."
Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence, 28
1. MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY

COLUm. L. REV. 432 n.2 (1928).

4. E.g., Showalter v. Western Pac. R. Co., 16 Cal. 2d 460, 106 P.2d 895
(1940); see also, Trouser Corp. of America v. Goodman & Theise, Inc., 153
F.2d 284 (3d Cir. 1946); Allen v. Mack, 345 Pa. 407, 28 A.2d 783 (1942). See
Hardman, Spontaneous Declarations (Res Gestae), 54 W. VA. L. REV. 93, 97
(1952); Hutchins and Slesinger, op. cit. supra note 3; Morgan, The Law of
Evidence, 1941-1945, 59 HARv. L. REV. 481, 575 (1946).
5. 6 WIGMoRE, EVIMENCE § 1749 (3d ed. 1940).
6. Starcher v. South Penn Oil Co., 81 W. Va. 587, 95 S.E. 28 (1918) is said
to be representative of the Thayer theory. Hardman, supra note 4, at 99. See
MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 298 (1957).
7. "The leading notion in the doctrine, so far as, upon analysis, it has anything to do with the law of evidence, seems to have been that of withdrawing

from the operation of the hearsay rule declarations of fact which were very
near in time to that which they tended to prove, fill out, or illustrate,-being
at the same time not narrative, but importing what was then present or but
just gone by, and so was open, either immediately or in the indications of it,
to the observation of the witness who testifies to the declaration, and who
can be cross-examined as to these indications; this nearness of time is made
specific by the terms 'contemporaneous' and 'a part of the res gesta,' and it is
enough that the declaration be substantially contemporaneous; it need not be
literally so...." THAYER, LEGAL ESSAYS 302 (1927).
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contrast to the prevailing view, the event need not be exciting.8
However, under both views the declaration must concern an event
or condition which takes place or exists at the time of the declaration. 9
Although Wigmore recognizes that the prevailing view requires an
event or condition the perception of which puts the declarant under
stress of nervous excitement, and a statement concerning that event
or condition made under the emotional stress, 0 he takes the position
that even statements which do not concern the exciting event or
condition should be admitted since the declarant's emotional state assures trustworthiness."
The hearsay statement in question in the instant case ordinarily
would be subject to the general agency rule that declarations of an
agent made after the occurrence of an act are not admissible against
the principal.'2 This general proposition, according to the court,
however, is of "relatively little significance" and will not be applied
if the circumstances surrounding the declaration of the agent assure
reliability.13 The court, adopting Wigmore's view, finds this reliability
in the fact of spontaneity produced by the exciting event. The other
element required by the prevailing view and by Thayer's view, that
the utterance must explain or describe the exciting event, is listed but
dismissed by the court as a "spurious element"'14 which is not absolutely essential to reliability. Conceding that more often than not
8. "In one class of cases the requirement of spontaneity is somewhat
attenuated. If a person observes some situation or happening which is not at
all startling or shocking in its nature, nor actually producing excitement in
the observer, the observer may yet have occasion to comment on what he
sees (or learns from other senses) at the very time that he is receiving the
impression. Such a comment, as to a situation then before the declarant,
does not have the safeguard of impulse, emotion, or excitement, but there are
other safeguards. In the first place, the report at the moment of the thing
then seen, heard, etc., is safe from any error from defect of memory of the
declarant. Secondly, there is little or no time for calculated misstatement,
and thirdly, the statement will usually be made to another (the witness who
reports it) who would have equal opportunities to observe and hence to
check a misstatement. . . ." McComwrcK & RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVDENCE

§ 430 (1937), quoted with approval in Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis, 139 Tex.
1, 161 S.W.2d 474 (1942). See MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 297 (1957).
9. See note 7 supra.

10. 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1750 (3d ed. 1940).
11. Evidently Mr. Wigmore's personal view concerning the admissibility of
statements which do not elucidate the, act itself is more liberal than the
present rule as applied by most of the courts. In stating the rule, he says, "The
utterance must relate to the circumstances of the occurrence preceding it. ..."
But he adds, "This is perhaps a cautionary rather than a logically necessary
restriction." 6 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 1750(c) (3d ed. 1940).
12. Warner v. Maine Cent. R.R., 111 Me. 149, 88 Atl. 403 (1913); Salmon v.
Pearce, 223 N.C. 587, 27 S.E.2d 647 (1943); Spence v. Browning Motor Freight

Lines, Inc., 138 W. Va. 748, 77 S.E.2d 806 (1953); Hamilton v. Reinemann, 233
Wis. 572, 290 N.W. 194 (1940).
13. Instant case, 249 F.2d at 510.

14. The court here relies upon 6 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1752, 1754 (3d ed.
1940).
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the utterance will relate to a description of the exciting occurrence, 5
the court concludes that any statement made contemporaneously with
an exciting event, if relevant, should be received, if the trial court, in
its discretion, determines that the statement was sufficiently spontaneous to be reliable. But, as the court points out, "it should be kept
in mind that as soon as the excited utterance goes beyond description of the exciting event and deals with past facts or with the future
it may tend to take on a reflective quality and must be more carefully
16
scrutinized with respect to ...true spontaneity."'

All utterances and other acts of communication involve certain
dangers, namely the meaning of the declarant's language or other act,
and the sincerity, memory, and perception of the declarant. 17 Where
the utterance takes the form of testimony in court these dangers are
guarded against by the oath and cross-examination. 18 Hearsay exceptions are based upon some guaranty which will assure reliability of
a hearsay declaration. The prevailing view's requirement of spontaneity, arising out of some emotional stress and concerning the
exciting event or condition which causes such stress, makes reflective
thinking and consequent insincerity unlikely. 19 Under this view, memory is not involved, and cross-examination concerning perception is
20
only of primary importance when the witness is also the declarant.
Thayer's view justifies reliance upon the declarant's sincerity since
the declaration must be made contemporaneously with the event or
condition which is the subject of the declaration. Here, as under the
prevailing view, memory is not involved. However, cross-examination
concerning perception is of primary importance since it is immaterial
whether the declarant himself or a bystander who witnessed the
event or condition is the witness. 21 If the witness is a bystander, his
own perception is subject to cross-examination which will aid the
trier of fact in evaluating the statement of the declarant. 22 Of course,
if the declarant himself is the witness he can be adequately examined
15. 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1754 (3d ed. 1940): "Practically, this language
amounts usually to little or nothing as a limitation; declarations which do
not in some way or other 'elucidate' or 'explain' the occurrence are naturally
not likely to be offered, and it is therefore easy enough to find that they do
furnish this required elucidation."
16. Instant case, 249 F.2d at 511.
17. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 211-13 (1957).
18. McCOmvrIcK, EVIDENCE § 224 (1954).
19. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 297 (1957).
20. Id. at 297-98.
21. Under the theory of contemporaneousness the declarant merely relates
his presently existing sense impressions while observing an event or condition.
A declaration made under such circumstances warrants admission into evidence since the declarant himself, or else a witness who also perceived the
event or condition, is subject to cross-examination concerning his observations, as well as the fact of the utterance. See Morgan, A Suggested Classification of UtterancesAdmissible as Res Gestae, 31 YALE L.J. 229, 236-37 (1922).
See MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 296-97 (1957).
22. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 297 (1957).
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concerning his statements, as is also true under the prevailing view.
Wigmore's theory places emphasis upon spontaneity and is liberal
concerning what must constitute the subject matter of the declaration.
Consequently, the danger of memory is involved under this view since
past facts can be the subject of the statement. Hence, the instant
court cautions that careful scrutiny is necessary so far as spontaneity
is concerned when the utterance deals with past facts.p Unfortunately,
courts generally seem to place themselves in the faulty dilemma of
choosing alternatively between Thayer's view and the prevailing
view. It is submitted that this is not sound reasoning. Both views
are necessary, and each provides some guaranty of reliability which
warrants receiving the declarations in evidence. In addition it is submitted that the more liberal theory of Wigmore, as applied by the
court in the instant case has sufficient safeguards to justify its use by
the courts in admitting hearsay evidence.

INSURANCE-AUTOMOBILE-DUPLICATING RECOVERIES
ALLOWED UNDER LIABILITY AND MEDICAL PAYMENTS
CLAUSES OF AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICY
Plaintiff's minor son was injured while riding in a truck insured by
the defendant company under an automobile liability policy containing a medical payments clause covering accidental injuries to occupants of the insured vehicle without regard to fault.1 The defendant
company paid the boy's medical expenses under this clause prior to
the instant litigation. Plaintiff recovered judgment below for $2,000
on behalf of her son under the liability coverage, but was denied an
additional judgment in her own behalf, also under the liability coverage, which would have duplicated the medical payments already
made. On cross appeals by both parties, held, judgment amended to
allow recovery of the medical expenses, and affirmed as amended. Unless otherwise provided in the contract, duplicating recoveries will be
allowed under the liability and medical payments clauses of a liability
23. Instant Case, 249 F.2d at 511.
1. The reported case does not give the wording of the policy under litigation, but quotes the standard medical payments clause from a previous case
thus: "To pay all reasonable expenses incurred within one year from the date
of accident for necessary medical, surgical, ambulance, hospital, professional
nursing and funeral services, to or for each person who sustains bodily injury, sickness or disease, caused by an accident, while in or upon, entering
or alighting from the automobile if the automobile is being used .by the
named insured or with his permission." 98 So. 2d 310, 312, n. 1, quoting
from Sims v. National Cas. Co., 43 So. 2d 26, 28 (1949).
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insurance policy. Distefano v. Delta Fire & Cas. Co., 98 So.2d 310
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
If a man has two $10,000 fire insurance policies on his house and
an arsonist causes him a $10,000 fire loss, the owner is entitled to recover from the wrongdoer or either or both insurance companies,
but he is not entitled to get back more than he lost. The equitable doctrines of subrogation and contribution were developed at an early date
to provide flexible means for laying the loss where it ought to fall
without depriving the injured party of his election of his most expeditious remedy.2 Thus if an insurer pays a loss he is entitled to assert the rights of the insured against a wrongdoer, and on similar
principles, is entitled to contribution from other insurers of the same
risk. The doctrines have never been universally applied, however,
and multiple recoveries have not been eliminated.3 No easy generalizations will explain how the courts draw the line beyond which
the principles will not be applied,4 but lists of types of insurance to
which the equitable principles are generally applied are easily drawn
2. "Where a man makes a double insurance for the same thing, in such a
manner that he can clearly recover against several insurers, in distinct policies,
a double satisfaction, 'the law certainly says, that he ought not to recover
doubly for the same loss, but be content with one single satisfaction for it.'...
And if the whole should be recovered from one, he ought to stand in the
place of the insured, to receive contribution from the other who was equally
liable to pay the whole." Godin v. London Assurance Co., 1 Burr. 489, 492,
97 Eng. Rep. 419, 421 (1758). See also Thurston v. Koch, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.)
348 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800); Rockingham Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Bosher, 39 Me.
253 (1855); Aetna Fire Ins. Co. v. Tyler, 16 Wend. 385 (N.Y. 1836); Mason v.
Sainsbury, 3 Doug. 61, 99 Eng. Rep. 538 (1782).
3. "The plaintiff is entitled to retain the benefit which he has paid for in
addition to the damages which he recovers on account of the defendants'
negligence." Bradburn v. Great Western R. Co., L. R. 10 Ex. 1 (1874). See
also McAdow v. Kansas City W. Ry. Co., 96 Kan. 423, 151 P. 1113 (1915);
Suttles v. Railway Mail Assoc., 156 App. Div. 435, 141 N.Y. Supp. 1024 (4th
Dept. 1913); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. J. B. Parker & Co., 96 Tex. 287, 72 S.W.
168 (1903); Gatzweiler v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 136 Wis. 34, 116
N.W. 633 (1908).
4. E.g., compare these generalizations by qualified writers:
"The general rule is, therefore, that the insurer is not subrogated to the insured's rights or to the beneficiary's rights under contracts of personal insurance." 3 APPLEmAN, INSURANCE LAw Am PRACTICE 278, § 1675 (1941).
"Nor, in the absence of a stipulation in the policy to that effect, is an insurance company subrogated, on the payment of an accident policy, to the
rights of the insured against the one who caused the injury, since accident insurance, unlike fire insurance, is not an indemnity contract, but an investment
contract." 29 AM. JuR., Insurance § 1340 (1940).
"Where, and only where, the insurance contract is regarded as one of
indemnity, the company, on payment of the loss, is subrogated .... ." 46 C.J.S.,
Insurance § 1209 (a)(1946).
"The view has also been advanced that accident insurance, being, except
in case of death, a contract of indemnity, is more analogous to fire insurance
than to any other branch of insurance; but, inasmuch as every insurance contract is one of indemnity, it is difficult to accede to this view." 1 C.J., Accident
Insurance § 2 (1914).
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Only two cases prior to the instant case had decided the doublerecovery problem presented under medical payments clauses attached
to liability insurance policies. In Severson v. Milwaukee Automobile
Ins. Co., 14 the Wisconsin Supreme Court allowed double recovery. In
Hawayek v. Simmons, 15 the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Orleans
Branch, denied double recovery. In the instant case the court disapproved the decision of its coordinate branch of the Louisiana Court
of Appeal and approved that of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. It
took some pains to establish its holding that the clause was a severable,
third party beneficiary contract, 16 citing the Wisconsin case, but it
ignored the language of the prior Louisiana opinion which appealed
to equity principles. 17 The court assumed that if the clause could be
treated as if it were a separate contract with a different insurer, no
argument could be made against double recovery, but no cases supporting such an assumption were cited.
The court's argument that the medical payments clause is a severable
one is sound enough, but it fails to dispose of the equitable considerations which were first invoked in the cases of separate policies and
separate insurers. 18 It is true, as the court points out,19 that the insurer could readily protect itself by writing proper provisions into
its policies, but the insurer could as readily protect itself by adjusting
its premium rates to cover the additional risk. It is doubtful if the
ordinary buyer of automobile insurance would, if given a choice, buy
insurance to provide as yet unidentified parties with cash windfalls
over and above their actual losses and expenses. At least there seems
to be little justification for assuming, as a matter of law, that the
purchaser of a standard automobile policy intends to buy or the seller
to sell double coverage for certain losses.
14. 265 Wis. 488, 61 N.W.2d 872 (1953).
15. 91 So. 2d 49 (La. App. Orleans 1956).
16. The court quotes and emphasizes language from a prior decision, Sims
v. National Cas. Co., 43 So. 2d 26, 29 (1949) saying that "the standard automobile liability policy 'not only protects Harris [the insured] against liability
and property damage [under the liability clauses] but it also contains a direct
obligation on the part of the defendant company to each person who sustains
bodily injury caused by accident while in the automobile and the medical payments coverage is not dependent upon any negligence on the part of the named
assured."' 98 So. 2d at 312. The Sims case dealt with imposition of a statutory
penalty for failure to settle on direct application of the injured party. No
double recovery question was involved, yet the court in the instant case
indicated it thought the Sims case, if considered, would have induced the
Orleans court to reach a different result in the Hawayek case, note 15 supra.
17. "It would be inequitable to construe the policy contract so as to allow
the plaintiff to collect double the amount of his damage" Hawayek v. Simmons,
91 So. 2d 49, 56 (La. App. Orleans 1956).
18. See note 2 supra.
19. 98 So. 2d at 314.
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INSURANCE-BUSINESS INDEMNITY-RADIATION
DECONTAMINATION EXPENSES NOT RECOVERABLE
UNDER A BUSINESS INTERRUPTION CLAUSE
Plaintiff corporation, a manufacturer of radiation measurement instruments, used a special calibration device for testing purposes which
contained a capsule of highly radioactive radium salt. While in use
the capsule in this testing device "popped" and emitted radioactive
powder in the plant. The resulting damage caused the plant to shut
down operations for some five months while decontamination processes were carried on. Plaintiff was insured under several policies
against loss of gross earnings caused by destruction or damage by
explosion.' A clause in some of the policies also covered expenses
necessarily incurred in reducing any loss under the policies. In an
action against the insurers, the district court awarded plaintiff $103,932.11 in damages, 2 including allowances for decontamination expenses.
On appeal, held, modified and affirmed. Expenses for the decontamination of a plant resulting from an explosion of radioactive materials
are not recoverable under a business interruption clause of a business
indemnity insurance policy in the absence of evidence that such expenses had actually reduced the business interruption losses. American Alliance Ins. Co. v. Keleket X-Ray Corp., 248 F.2d 920 (6th Cir.
1957).
The interest insured under a business indemnity policy is loss of
profits or gross earnings resulting from an interruption of the business. 3
Such a policy does not cover physical losses to the building or other
property of the insured. Typically however, such a policy will contain a clause allowing reimbursement to the insured of expenses which
are necessarily incurred for the purpose of reducing any loss under
the policy, not exceeding the amount by which the loss is reduced. 4
Thus, repairing damaged property may result in a loss not covered by
1. The policies involved were of two types. One covered direct loss by explosion to stock, materials and supplies and the other against loss of gross earnings resulting directly from necessary interruption of business caused by destruction or damage by explosion. The opinion does not indicate whether or
not the insured had any insurance on the building itself.
2. The verdict consisted of $55,724.56 stock loss, $7,735.80 business interruption loss, $19,862.69 decontamination expense to reduce the loss under the
business interruption policy, plus interest, for a total of $103,932.11.
3. "The object of business indemnity insurance is to insure against loss
from interruption of business as a whole ...

."

29 Am. JuR., Insurance § 1093

(1940).
4. "6. Expense to Reduce Loss: This policy also covers such expenses
as are necessarily incurred for the purpose of reducing any loss under
this policy (except expense incurred to extinguish a fire), not exceeding,
however, the amount by which the loss under this policy is thereby reduced.

Such expenses shall not be subject to the application of the Contribution
Clause." Taken from Uniform Standard Form No. 19C, Business Interruption Form No. 4, used by Cherokee Insurance Co., Nashville, Tenn.
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the policy but nevertheless it may be an expense "necessarily incurred" in reducing a loss of gross earnings or profits by the insured
by returning the property to normal productivity. Insurers, however,
apparently take the position that "expenses necessarily incurred in
reducing loss of profits" include only those expenses incurred in maintaining the normal level of earnings through use of other property
while the damaged property is being repaired or extraordinary expenses incurred in expediting repair of the damaged property. 5 Normal
expenses of repair are considered to be normal operating expenses and
not expenses for reduction of loss of profits. In the instant case the
insurers took the position that decontamination expenses were merely
for the purpose of restoring the premises to normal productivity and
thus were not covered by the business indemnity policies. This position does not appear to have been directly dealt with in other decisions, possibly because there is usually present a policy covering
property damage. There is language, however, in some opinions
which seems to indicate that recovery would be allowed under such
circumstances. 6
The court in the instant case held that inasmuch as the interest insured was loss of gross earnings and not compensation for destruction
of physical property, the insured could not recover the expenditures
for decontaminating the premises. The court intimated, however,

that if the insured had "proved" that the expenditures had reduced
the loss under the business interruption policies, recovery would have
been allowed. This would have the effect of placing the burden of
proof upon the insured to show that his expenditures actually reduced
a loss under the policy. It is generally stated that the insured has
the burden of proving a loss within the terms of a policy 7 but if proof
is made of a loss apparently covered the burden is then upon the
insurer to show that the loss arose from an excepted cause or from
a cause which limits its liability.8 Here, the court found that the insured had the burden of showing that the loss was caused by an
5. REED, ADJUSTMENT OF PROPERTY Loss

498-499 (2d ed. 1953).

Interview

with attorney of Cherokee Ins. Co., Nashville, Tenn. The basic reason is
that the policy contains another provision requiring the insured to exercise
due diligence and dispatch in rebuilding, repairing or replacing the destroyed
or damaged property. However, there is nothing in this provision which
would preclude such expenses from being necessarily incurred in reducing
business interruption loss. Other reasons are that the repairs are a normal cost
of operation and the insurance does not cover property losses.
6. See Hart-Bartlett-Sturtevant Grain Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 365 Mo. 1134, 293
S.W.2d 913 (1956). This case involved expenses necessarily incurred in cleaning up and restoring grain bins following a flood and explosion. Recovery
was denied however, because the insured did not or could not separate the
expenses necessarily incurred to repair the flood damage from the explosion
damage and the policy only covered expenses necessarily incurred for reduction of loss due to interruption of business by explosion.
7. 29 AM. JuR. Insurance § 1443 (1940).
8. 29 Am. Jua. Insurance § 1444 (1940).
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explosion, but that the burden did not then shift to the insurer to
show that it was not liable for this part of the loss. The court treated
this as an additional burden of the insured and in effect held that he
had not shown that he came within the coverage of the policy. The
dissent felt that this was reading another exception into the policy.9
Loss due to radioactive contamination of buildings and other property is a relatively new result of modern scientific developments.
Thus a new problem in insurance is presented-will existing insurance
coverage extend to this type of loss, or will a new type of policy have
to be developed? The latter suggestion appears more feasible, but
due to a lack of underwriting information available to insurers at the
present time this approach will probably be cautious at first. As
statistical information is gradually collected and a satisfactory basis
for underwriting the risk is evolved, this type of coverage will become readily available to industry. In the meantime it would seem
advisable for any industry using radioactive materials to reevaluate
its insurance program before, rather than after, a loss occurs.

INSURANCE-LIFE-VARIABLE ANNUITY CONTRACTS
NOT SUBJECT TO REGULATION BY
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
The Securities and Exchange Commission sought to enjoin the sale
of variable annuity contracts by defendant, an insurance company
registered in the District of Columbia,' unless and until such contracts
were registered with the SEC under the Securities Act of 19332 and
the Investment Company Act of 1940. 3 The SEC contended that these
contracts were securities within the purview of these acts, while
defendant maintained that they were insurance policies, not subject
to such regulation by virtue of the McCarran - Ferguson Act. 4 Held,
complaint dismissed. The McCarran -Ferguson Act precludes SEC
regulation of variable annuity contracts when sold by insurance
companies which are first licensed and regulated by local insurance
9. 248 F.2d at 933. It should be noted that the majority opinion approved
the accounting method used by the insurers, which limited the loss due to
business interruption to $7,735.80. The maximum recoverable under the
policy would have been $19,862.69 more as it could not exceed the amount
by which the loss was reduced.
1. The National Ass'n. of Securities Dealers, Inc. was made an intervenorplaintiff, and the Equity Annuity Life Ins. Co. was made an intervenordefendant, both on their own motions.
2. 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b-v (Supp. IV, 1957).
3. 54 Stat. 789 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2 to -24 (Supp. IV 1957).
4. 59 Stat. 33 (1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1952).
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commissions. SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 155 F. Supp. 521
(D.D.C. 1957).
The Securities Act of 1933 defines a security as "...
any . . . certificate of interest in any profit sharing agreement."5 An investment company is defined by the Investment Company Act of 1940 as any issuer
which ". . is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily ... in the
business of investing, reinvesting ... or trading in securities. '6 The
variable annuity is a contract which does not conform to the classic
concept of an annuity in that rather than paying a fixed number of
dollars at periodic intervals, 7 its payments are designed to vary with
the value of a common stock fund.8 Thus it operates very much like
an investment trust or open end investment company, both of which
are subject to SEC regulation. 9 Instead of getting a fixed return, the
purchaser's annuity income will depend upon the investment experience of a common stock fund, the expectation being that the equity
securities therein will protect the purchasing power of the annuity investment.' 0 Because of the unique nature of the variable annuity, the
5. 48 Stat. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77(b) (1) (1952).
6. 54 Stat. 797 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-3 (a) (1) (1952).
7. Booth v. Ammerman, 4 Bradf. 129 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1856); VANCE, INsuRANCE § 200 (3d ed. 1951). For a comparison of the variable annuity and the
ordinary annuity, see, Johnson, The Variable Annuity: What It Is and Why
It Is Needed, 1956 INs. L.J. 357, 361-64.
8. The variable annuity functions thus under this particular policy: The
purchaser acquires accumulation units in a fund which is invested in common stocks. To determine how much an accumulation unit will cost, the
total market value of the fund is divided by the number of outstanding units,
just as the value of each share of an investment fund is computed by dividing
the total asset value of the fund by the number of outstanding shares.
Usually the contract holder will be investing a fixed sum per year and the
number of units he will buy each year fluctuates with the price of the accumulation unit as it reflects changes in the common stock fund. The units
will accumulate over the years, and when the policy holder retires and
elects to take the variable annuity option as opposed to one of the other
options offered, his total accumulation units will be converted into an
annuity fund. To do this, the number of units he has accumulated will be
multiplied by the value of a unit at that time, giving a cash sum. Using this
sum, the first annuity payment is computed using the progressive annuity
table and an interest rate of 3%%, just like an ordinary annuity would be
computed if the purchaser had paid a lump sum. The first annuity payment
is then divided by the value of one unit and this number of annuity units
will remain fixed during the contract term. The contract holder will receive
this number of units every year, in the same fashion that an ordinary annuity holder receives a fixed number of dollars every year. The major
difference between this and the ordinary annuity will be that the value of
the unit paid under the variable annuity will fluctuate with the investment
experience of the common stock fund, theoretically protecting the holder
against inflation, whereas the ordinary annuity will pay the same amount
despite economic change.
9. 54 Stat. 784 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 (a) (2) (1952).
10. Day, A Variable Annuity: A Common Stock Investment Scheme, 1956
INs. L.J. 393; Johnson, The Variable Annuity, 7 J. Am. Soc'Y C.L.U. 67 (1952).
It should be noted that the variable annuity is not a cure all. While it

may operate as a hedge against inflation it offers no security against depressions nor unusual stock market trends. The oldest form of variable annuity is that offered by the College Retirement Equities Fund (CREF),
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above definitions of "security" and "investment company" would appear to apply to the contracts sold by defendant. Besides its investment characteristics, however, the variable annuity has many insurance facets," e.g., term life, disability insurance, and other annuity
options beside the variable annuity plan. Such a contract could correctly be termed a policy of insurance properly to be sold by insurance companies which are exempt from regulation under both
the Securities and Investment Company Acts 12 and which are subject
13
to regulation only by the states under the McCarran - Ferguson Act.
This appears to be the first case to determine what governmental
body has regulatory power over the variable annuity contract. 14 The
court, recognizing that the contract does not lend itself to exclusive
classification as either a security or a policy of insurance, analyzed
the statutes in these respective areas to determine which law should
control. The conclusion was reached that if it were not for the McCarran Act the SEC should regulate this hybrid creation under section 2 (1) of the Securities Act 15 and sections 3 (a) (1) and (3) of the
Investment Company Act.16 However, the contracts were being sold
as insurance policies, defendant was licensed and regulated as an insurance company, and the McCarran Act explicitly excludes federal
agencies from regulation of the insurance business.' 7 Thus, the conclusion was reached that if the SEC is to be given power to regulate
the sale of these contracts, only Congress can do so.
which is associated with the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association
(TIAA), both of which are nonprofit organizations to assist college professors in their retirement. Recognizing that the equity nature of the variable
annuity might not protect the participant under all market conditions, a requirement was established that no more than 50% of premium payments
can be paid into CREF, the balance must go into TIAA which is a conventional form of annuity program. For a complete discussion of this plan
see Lloyd, CREF and TIAA-A Variable Annuity Plan in Action, 35 TRUST
BULL. 50 (1956). See, Long, The Variable Annuity: A Common Stock Investment Scheme, 1956 INS. L.J. 393. "Over the last half century there have
been eight instances in which the stock market has dropped 40 per cent or
more . . . during four of these substantial drops in stock prices the cost of
living actually increased. In the four other instances, while the cost of living decreased, it declined only a small fraction of the drop in stock prices."
Pyle, The Case Against Variable Annuities, 1956 INS. L.J. 766-77.
11. For an argument that the variable annuity is insurance, see, Day, A
Variable Annuity Is an Annuity, 1955 INS. L.J. 755.

12. 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (8) (1952).
13. 59 Stat. 34 (1945), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1012(a), (b) (1952).

14. For further discussion of the variable annuity see: Johnson, The Variable Annuity: What It Is and Why It Is Needed, 1955 INS. L.J. 357; Kvernland,

Some Economic and Investment Aspects of Variable Annuities, 1956 INS. L.J.

373; Schechter, Variable Annuities-Boon or Bane? 1956 INs. L.J. 764; Note, 43

VA. L. REv. 669 (1957).
15. 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1952).

16. 54 Stat. 789 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80 (a)(1), (3)(1952).
17. "The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, should
be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or
taxation of such business." 59 Stat. 34 (1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1012
(b) (1952).

1456

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 11

Obviously the court was faced with a difficult and unique problem
and perhaps reached the only feasible solution when it likened this
novel contract to a "wild horse" which only Congress could "brand"
by future legislation. 3 Although the authority of the decision is
somewhat weakened by the court's own misgivings as to the soundness of its classification of the contract as insurance, the result reached
seems reasonable irrespective of future congressional action. The
protection of the purchaser is the purpose of any such regulation, and
it would seem that this can be carried out locally by the state insurance commissions as well as by the SEC. The confusion and waste of
dual regulation is avoided by the result here reached. Seemingly state
insurance departments can more efficiently regulate the variable annuity because of its insurance features. Consideration should also be
given to the experience that the insurance commissions have had in
regulating the investment policies of the insurance industry. 19

PHYSICIANS-UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCTWILLFUL EVASION OF FEDERAL TAXES AS AN OFFENSE
ALLOWING SUMMARY ACTION BY DISCIPLINARY BOARD
Defendant, a physician, had pleaded guilty to a charge of willful
evasion of a portion of his federal income taxes by the filing of a false
and fraudulent tax return.' A Washington statute2 empowered a
medical board to discipline members of the medical profession for
"unprofessional conduct," including "conviction in any court of any
offense involving moral turpitude, in which case the record of such
conviction shall be conclusive evidence." Although defendant contended that his offense did not involve moral turpitude or constitute
unprofessional conduct, the medical board summarily 3 suspended his
18. Instant case at 527.
19. This decision has been affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia. See 26 U.S.L. Week 2591. The court said that the statutes
show an unmistakeable determination on the part of Congress to leave the
insurance business in the control of the states until Congress should in plain
terms exert its power over some or all aspects of it. Emphasis is placed on
the fact that "the ... contracts have many qualities of the traditional business
of insurance." 26 U.S.L. Week 2591, 2594.

1. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 145(b), making willful tax evasion a
felony. This is now included in §§ 7201-03 of the INT. REV. CODE OF 1954.
2. REV. CODE WASH. 18.72.030 (1) (1930).

3. The medical board did serve notice upon Dr. Kindschi that a hearing
would be held and set out the charge against him. When the board convened
however, the chairman announced that it was the opinion of the attorney
general of the state of Washington that the crime involved "moral turpitude"
and thus there would be no hearing on the question, nor would any evidence
be taken concerning the facts and circumstances involved.
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license for a period of eight months. A lower state court affirmed the
board's action. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Washington, held,
affirmed. The willful evasion of federal income taxes by the filing of
a false and fraudulent tax return involves moral turpitude and a
plea of guilty to such a charge is conclusive evidence of unprofessional
conduct allowing summary action by a statutorily created disciplinary
board. In the Matter of Kindschi, 319 P.2d 824 (Wash. 1958).
It is well settled that the power of a state to provide for the welfare
of its citizens includes the power to create an administrative agency
with authority to deny, revoke or suspend professional licenses. 4 But
due process generally requires that the cause for such denial, suspension or revocation have a rational connection with the applicant's
fitness or capacity to practice the particular profession. 5 The prescribed
grounds for such action vary somewhat among jurisdictions, but one
ground common to most states is the commission of an offense involving "moral turpitude.' 6 Conduct involving moral turpitude has been
judicially described as conduct which is "inherently wrongful" 7 or
"immoral in itself,"8 but in practice the courts have often reached
conflicting conclusions as to what types of conduct are included within
this description. 9 Members of the learned professions have been found
guilty of moral turpitude for committing such offenses as violation of
the Narcotics Act,10 indecent exposure" and use of the mails to
transmit information regarding the procuring of an abortion.' 2 On the
4. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889); State Medical Board v.
McCrary, 95 Ark. 511, 130 S.W. 544 (1910); State ex rel. Chapman v. State
Board of Medical Examiners, etc., 34 Minn. 387, 26 N.W. 123 (1885).
5. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Douglas v.
Noble, 261 U.S. 165 (1923); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277,
319-20 (1866).

6. In most jurisdictions statutes specify the grounds for revocation. See
e.g., ARx. STAT. AxN. § 72-613(1) (1947); COLO. REv. STAT. Am. §§ 91-1-18(1),
91-1-17(6); MD. Aix. CODE Art. 43, § 145 (1957); Tmwr. CODE ANN. §§ 63-618
-619 (8) (1956). However, in at least one jurisdiction the license itself on its
face states that it may be revoked for cause. See Hawaii Rev. Laws § 64-6
(1955).
7. State v. Hollingsworth, 108 Fla. 607, 146 So. 660, 661 (1933).
8. Fort v. Brinkley, 87 Ark. 400, 112 S.W. 1084, 1085 (1908).
9. Compare U.S. v. Carrollo, 30 F. Supp. 3 (W.D. Mo. 1939), with Chanan
Din Khan v. Barber, 147 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Cal. 1957). Both cases involved
the deportation of an alien on grounds of a conviction of a crime involving
'moral turpitude." In the former, the Missouri court said that it was not
prepared to hold that ,a willful attempt to evade the payment of a tax was an
act evidencing baseness, vileness, or depravity of moral character to constitute
"moral turpitude," While in the latter the California court held that willfully
attempting to evade payment of taxes was an offense involving "moral turpitude."

Frequently the surrounding circumstances may determine whether any

"moral turpitude" was involved, see State Medical Examiners v. Friedman,
150 Tenn. 152, 263 S.W. 75, 83 (1924). See, in general, Annot., 109 A.L.R. 1459
(1937).
10. White v. Andrew, 70 Colo. 50, 197 Pac. 564 (1921).
11. Brun v. Lazzell, 172 Md. 314, 191 Atl. 240 (1937).
12. State Medical Examiners v. Harrison, 92 Wash. 577, 159 Pac. 769 (1916).
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other hand, such conduct as the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors 13
and the sending of obscene leters through the mail 14 have been held
not to involve moral turpitude.
Section 145 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 193915 provided
that "any person.., who willfully attempts in any manner to evade
or defeat any tax imposed by this chapter or the payment thereof,
shall. . . be guilty of a felony." Although the court in the instant case
recognized that there is some dispute as to whether fraud is inherent in
every violation of this section, 16 it reasoned that defendant's plea of
guilty to a charge of filing a false and fraudulent tax return was conclusive evidence that his conduct included an element of fraud. Thus,
it was held that fraudulent tax evasion in violation of section 145 (b)
was an offense involving moral turpitude. As such it was unprofessional conduct within the meaning of the state statute and a proper
ground for summary suspension of defendant's license to practice
medicine by the medical board.
The term "moral turpitude" will probably continue to plague the
courts and administrative boards as they attempt case by case to
translate an ethical into a legal concept. Though the courts readily
point out that the sandards to be applied should not be based on an
ideal person, but should be that standard of right conduct generally
prevailing in the community, 17 the result reached in many cases
seems to rest upon the moral reactions of the judges to the particular
offense involved. Regardless of what standards of morality are applied
it would seem that conduct which is intended to defraud the government involves "moral turpitude" just as fully as does conduct which
is intended to defraud an individual.'8 Perhaps it would be better
13. Fort v. Brinkley, 87 Ark. 400, 112 S.W. 1084 (1908); Kentucky State

Dental Examiners v. Crowell, 220 Ky. 1, 294 S.W. 818 (1926).
14. In re Dampier, 46 Ida. 195, 267 Pac. 452 (1928).
15. See note 1 supra.

16. See In re Hallinan, 43 Cal.2d 243, 272 P.2d 768 (1954); see also Kentucky
State Bar Association v. McAfee, 301 S.W.2d 899 (Ky. 1957).
17. See U.S. v. Reimer, 113 F.2d 429, 431 (2d Cir. 1940) (dissenting opinion).
"[W]e must try to appraise the moral repugnance of the ordinary man toward
the conduct in question; not what an ideal citizen would feel." See also, In re
Hopkins, 54 Wash. 569, 103 Pac. 805, 806 (1909).
18. According to at least one author the reason why the average American
would not think of cheating his neighbor or customer, and nevertheless will
cheat his government is that he feels that the latter is the same as outwitting
a machine, or something else impersonal. The author uses an example of a
customer who, having picked up a loaf of bread in a grocery store, has laid his
coin on the counter in payment. Although he sees that the clerk is busy with
other customers he feels not the slightest temptation to cheat by taking the
coin back. However, deciding to make a phone call, he deposits his coin,
makes his call, and after hanging up the receiver instinctively sticks his
finger into the receptacle provided for return of coins on uncompleted calls.
When he finds that the mechanism, operating faultily, has returned his payment he takes the coin, puts it in his pocket, and leaves the store with a
gratified smile and a quiet conscience. CAN, Tm MORAL DEcIsIoN (1955).
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in such professional hearings if there were less concern about whether
or not the particular offense involved "moral turpitude" in the abstract
sense, and a greater emphasis placed on the purpose behind the statute
in which the term is used. If the legislature intended that a physician
should be deprived of the right to practice only where it has been
shown that he is unfit to practice medicine and is endangering the
public health and safety, it is arguable that the filing of a fraudulent
income tax return has little real connection with his capabilities as a
physician. 19 However, if such statutes have the additional purpose of
enabling administrative boards to protect the standing of the profession in the eyes of the public, it would seem that the holding in the
instant case reaches a proper result.

SALES-WARRANTIES-LIABILITY OF MANUFACTURER TO
ULTIMATE CONSUMER ON BASIS OF EXPRESS WARRANTY
NOTWITHSTANDING THE ABSENCE OF PRIVITY
OF CONTRACT
Plaintiff purchased defendant manufacturer's cosmetic product from
a retail merchant in reliance on the defendant's advertisements proclaiming the merits and quality of the product and its harmlessness
and safety when devoted to its intended use. The cosmetic, in fact,
contained such harmful and deleterious ingredients that the plaintiff
suffered injury even though she followed the manufacturer's directions explicitly.' The plaintiff sought recovery on the bases of negligence and breach of express warranty. 2 The defendant's demurrer to
the cause of action on express warranty was sustained by the trial
19. In contrast, the same offense by an attorney would have a obvious relationship with his sworn obligation to uphold the law. This line of reasoning
might also reconcile the result reached in the instant case, where the physician
was only suspended for eight months, with that reached under an almost
identical fact situation involving an attorney, who was disbarred permanently
from the practice of law. See In re Seijas, 318 P.2d 961 (Wash. 1957).

It should be noted however, that the court in the instant case did not use this
reasoning to reconcile the two cases. It expressed the opinion that there was
no difference in tax fraud, whether perpetrated by a lawyer or a doctor, but
added that the discretion as to the severity of the penalty had been vested in
the medical board.
1. The harmful ingredients were not disclosed, but the injury was that
upon the application of the defendant's product, a home permanent set, the
plaintiff's hair fell out to within one-half inch of her scalp.
2. Plaintiff's petition consisted of three causes of action, the first based on
negligence, the second on express warranty, and the third on implied warranty. The judgment sustaining the demurrer to the action on implied
warranty was affirmed. For a discussion that an implied warranty is excluded
by an express warranty, see 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 239a, (rev. ed. 1948).
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court, but this ruling was reversed by the intermediate appellate
court.3 On appeal, held, affirmed. A manufacturer who represents to
the ultimate consumer that his product is fit and safe for its intended
use and who urges the consumer to purchase the product from a retailer, renders himself liable on the basis of express warranty to the
ultimate consumer who is injured in reliance thereon, notwithstanding
the absence of contractual relations between them. Rogers v. Toni
Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio 238, 147 N.E.2d 609 (1958).
The basic rule is that a manufacturer of a defective article is not
liable on the basis of breach of warranty for personal injuries resulting therefrom to an ultimate consumer who has purchased from a
middleman inasmuch as no privity of contract has been established
between manufacturer and consumer. 4 Certain exceptions to this rule
have arisen, however,5 where the product is an "inherently dangerous"
article or a food commodity designed for human consumption. Manufacturers have repeatedly been held liable in such cases, notwithstanding the absence of direct contractual relations with the subpurchaser
who is injured.6 This liability has often resulted from judicial extension of the manufacturer's warranty. Some of the theories used for
such an extension are that the warranty attaches to and runs with the
chattel;7 that the warranty runs directly to the consumer where the
3. Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 139 N.E.2d 871 (Ohio App. 1957).

4. See, e.g., Racklin v. Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 96 F.2d 597 (2d Cir.

1938). See also 1 WILLSTON, SALES § 244 (rev. ed. 1948).
5. One of the first and most famous decisions holding that a negligent
manufacturer was liable to a remote vendee was MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). That a manufacturer may be strictly
liable to a remote vendee in an action for negligence where the injury was
caused by an inherently dangerous product, see Carter v. Yardley & Co.,
319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946). The presence of a deleterious substance
in a bottle of beverage or prepared food is sufficient for the application of
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Massey, 193 Ark.
423, 100 S.W.2d 681 (1937). The manufacturer may be liable to the consumer
on the theory of false representation. Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co.,
290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939). For liability based on implied warranty
as a matter of public policy, see Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609,
164 S.W.2d 828 (1942).
6. Free v. Sluss, 87 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 933, 197 P.2d 854 (1948); Bahlman
v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939); Simpson v.
American Oil Co., 217 N.C. 542, 8 S.E.2d 813 (1940); Baxter v. Ford Motor Co.,
168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932). See Feezer, Manufacturer's Liability for
Injuries Caused by His Products: Defective Automobiles, 37 MieC. L. REy. 1
(1938); Jeanblanc, Manufacturers' Liability To Persons Other Than Their
Immediate Vendees, 24 VA. L. Ray. 134 (1937). Apparently, there are few,
if any, cases extending the manufacturer's liability to the ultimate consumer
for property damage caused by defective goods. See 8 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
273 (1951).
7. Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N.W. 382 (1920);
Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927); Simpson
v. American Oil Co., 217 N.C. 542, 8 S.E.2d 813 (1940); Catani v. Swift & Co.,
251 Pa. 52, 95 Atl. 931 (1915). The general rule is, however, that the benefit
of a warranty on the sale of personalty does not run with the chattel on
resale and does not give a subsequent purchaser a right of action on the
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article is purchased while still in its original container or package; 8
and that the warranty to the consumer may be created from the
circumstances surrounding modern merchandising practices.9 The
manufacturer has also been held liable upon the theories of third
party beneficiary'0 and of assignment of the retailer's cause of action."
In any event, the underlying reason usually given for the extension
of the warranty is that, as a matter of public policy, the mere absence
of a direct contractual relationship should not prevent redress for
the manufacturer's wrong.'2
The court in the instant case has placed a third category, cosmetics,
within the exceptions to the basic rule, and has stated by implication that the confusing and not too credible theories upon which
the extension of the manufacturer's warranty have been based are,
in the last analysis, unnecessary. The reason is that "warranty,"
though generally thought of solely in terms of contractual relationships, actually had its origin in an action sounding in tort as an
expansion of the action of trespass on the case to include deceit,
and, upon such action, privity is not necessary.' 3 Although such contractual relationship was eventually deemed essential to a cause
of action on the warranty, the exceptions involving foodstuffs and
inherently dangerous articles were not, in light of the above history,
a substantial departure from the original conception of the action.
It follows then, that those exceptions may be properly expanded
to other categories, and that the requirement of privity, if it is a
requirement, may at least be established where the ultimate consumer has justifiably relied on and has been induced by the manufacturer's modern merchandising techniques.
warranty against the original seller. See Pelletier v. Dupont, 124 Me. 269,
128 Atl. 186 (1925).

8. Catani v. Swift & Co., 251 Pa. 52, 95 Atl. 931 (1915); Ward v. Great At-

lantic & Pacific Tea Co., 231 Mass. 90, 120 N.E. 225 (1918); Grant v. Graham
Chero-Cola Bottling Co., 176 N.C. 256, 97 S.E. 27 (1918). There is a split,

however, as to the theory upon which the manufacturer's liability is based,
whether upon an implied warranty or on negligence. See Pelletier v. Dupont,
124 Me. 269, 128 Atl. 186 (1925). See also Minutilla v. Providence Ice Cream
Co., 50 R.I. 43, 144 Atl. 884 (1929), for the position that liability should attach
to the manufacturer irrespective of the theory upon which the action is based.
9. Madouros v. Kansas City Coca Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275, 90
S.W.2d 445 (1936); Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932).
10. Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928).
11. See 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 998 (rev. ed. 1936).
12. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944);

Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946). See also
TORTS,

§ 84 (2d ed. 1955); 1 WILLISTON,

SALES §

PROSSER,

244 (a) (rev. ed. 1948). For a

comprehensive discussion of the view that manufacturers should be strictly
liable to ultimate consumers, see Symposium-Strict Liability of Manufacturers,24 TENN. L. REV. 923 (1957).
1

13. Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1888). See also
195, 197 (rev. ed. 1948); PROSSER, TORTS § 83 (2d ed.

WILLISTON, SALES §§

1955).
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The actual holding of the principal case is primarily a further extension of the known exceptions to the rule of no liability without
privity. The underlying theory advanced by the court seems to be
that privity in fact is found in the methods of modern merchandising
where the advertisements and representations of the manufacturer
are aimed directly at the consumer. But the language of the court
hints at even a further development-that the manufacturer may be
held liable, under similar fact situations, without reference to privity
in any respect.14 Does this approach suggest that an action on a
warranty may be maintained without privity in personal injury
cases under any fact situation? 5 Whatever the answer may be, the
court here seems to have removed an outmoded legal barrier which
heretofore stood in the way of the axiom, "a right for every wrong."

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-RECOVERY OF ADDITIONAL
COMPENSATION FOR TOTAL DISABILITY AFTER RECEIPT
OF MAXIMUM SCHEDULE BENEFITS FOR SPECIFIC INJURIES
While painting steel beams for his employer, plaintiff was struck by
a falling beam which cut off four fingers and caused severe injury to
a leg, requiring its subsequent amputation. He was awarded compensation for a period of 300 weeks for specific loss of members in accord
with appropriate schedules in the Michigan Workmen's Compensation Act.' At the expiration of this period plaintiff applied for further
compensation, alleging total disability. Additional compensation was
awarded by the hearing officer 2 and this was affirmed by a divided appeal board with the modification that payments should not be extended
beyond 750 weeks from the date of the injury. On appeal, held,
14. After reviewing the history of the action of warranty and illustrating
that the orthodox rule requiring privity may in fact be undermined by a true
understanding of warranty, the court said: "Occasions may arise when it is
fitting and wholesome to discard legal concepts of the past [i.e. the orthodox
rule] to meet new conditions and practices of our changing and progressing
civilization." 147 N.E.2d at 615.
15. A recent decision by the Supreme Court of Michigan gives another indication that this question will eventually be answered in the affirmative. It
was held that a manufacturer may be liable for the deterioration of its product
and resulting damage to the property of the ultimate consumer on the theory
of negligence or implied warranty without the requirement of privity. Spence
v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873
(1958), 36 U. DET. L.J. 109 (1958).

1. At the time of injury, December 22, 1948, the Michigan Workmen's
Compensation Act provided for payments for 200 weeks for loss of a leg
and 100 weeks for the loss of four fingers. MICH. Comp. LAWS § 412.10 (1948),
subsequently amended to MICH. STAT. ANx. § 17.160 (Supp. 1957).

2. As allowed by MIcH. CoMP. LAWS § 412.9 (1948), subsequently amended

to MIcH.

STAT. ANN.

§ 17.159 (Supp. 1957).
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affirmed. An injured employee may recover additional workmen's
compensation benefits for total disability although he has already received the statutorily prescribed maximum benefits for losses of specific members of the body. Van Dorpel v. Haven-Busch Co., 85 N.W.2d
97 (Mich. 1957).
There is judicial conflict as to whether the receipt of workmen's
compensation benefits for loss of specific members of the body bars recovery of further compensation for total disability resulting from
the same injury.3 When no complications arise from the injury, the
majority of cases limit recovery exclusively to the prescribed schedule
benefits although the workman can prove total disability at the expiration of the schedule period. 4 On the other hand, where the loss
of the member extends to and affects the efficiency of other parts of
the body, many decisions allow the workman to recover further compensation for the resulting disability.5 A related problem arises when
a workman suffers a compensable injury which does not result in
total disability, and subsequently suffers a second compensable injury
to a different part of the body which, when combined with the previous
injury, results in total disability. In these "successive injury" situations compensation for total disability has often been allowed without
any deduction for previous awards. 6 The harsh effect that such a
result has upon employers has led in many states to statutory relief
designed to reimburse the employer.7 In the final analysis, the de3. The problem of whether schedule allowances are exclusive is still un-

settled. "[T]he central question is whether loss of a smaller listed member
can be viewed as a fractional loss of the whole larger member or body of
which it is a part." 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 58.20 (1952).
4. See New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Brown, 81 Ga. App. 790, 69 S.E.2d 245
(1950); Lappinen v. Union Ore Co., 224 Minn. 395, 29 N.W.2d 8 (1947). See
also 20 TENN. L. REV. 333, 355 (1948).
5. Arbanos v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 275 App. Div. 881, 88 N.Y.S.2d
839 (3d Dept. 1949); Plumlee v. Maryland Casualty Co., 184 Tenn. 497, 201
S.W.2d 664 (1947); Olson v. Griffin Wheel Co., 218 Minn. 48, 15 N.W.2d
511 (1944). See 58 Am. JuR. Workmen's Compensation § 293 (1948); Annot.,
156 A.L.R. 1344 (1945).
6. The amount recoverable for a second or subsequent injury is governed by
express statutory provisions. See Annots., 30 A.L.R. 979 (1924); 96 A.L.R.
1080 (1935). However, in the absence of such provisions, it is generally held
that total incapacity may result and be compensated for, when a person has
already been deprived of a member or its use, neither of which injury would
of itself result in total disability. Annot., 67 A.L.R. 785 (1930). Particularly
important in the successive injury area is the loss of an eye followed by a
subsequent injury resulting in the loss of the other eye. Although there is
some authority to the contrary, Powers v. Motor Wheel Corp., 252 Mich.
639, 234 N.W. 122, 73 A.L.R. 702 (1931), it is generally held that recovery for total disability in such a situation will be allowed. See Annots.,
8 A.L.R. 1324 (1920); 73 A.L.R. 706 (1931); 99 A.L.R. 1498 (1935); 142 A.L.R.
822 (1942). See also 58 Am. JuR. Workmen's Compensation § 290 (1948).
7. This is accomplished in one of two ways: an "apportionment rule" or a
"second injury fund." An apportionment statute usually provides that an
employee who had a prior disability would receive for a subsequent disability
only what he would have received for the latter injury considered alone. 2
LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 59.20 (1952). A second injury
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termination of the exclusiveness of a schedule benefit depends on
many factors, including both the strictness of interpretation of the
statute and the category within which the injured workman is able to
bring himself.
Prior to this decision, Michigan was in accord with the apparent
majority rule of Curtis v. Hayes Wheel Co. 8 to the effect than an

employee who has recovered his health without complications arising
from the loss of a specific member is limited in his recovery to the
schedule allowances. However, the court in the instant case departed
from the Curtis rule9 and stated that the better test as to whether
compensation should be extended should be, could the injured workman go back to work? If not, and, if total disability was supported by
competent proof, then payments should extend as long as the statute
allows. The court concluded that it should do all in its power to
further the legislative intent behind the Workmen's Compensation Act
of compensating the injured workman insofar as possible.
Schedule benefits are not based upon earning capacity, but rather
on the supposed cash value of the lost member to an injured workman. 10 Therefore, when the injured party is able to bring himself under more than one provision of the act, it would seem that a court
should apply that provision which is most favorable to the claimant."
When a person is totally disabled, whether the disability results from
complications arising from the injury or from mere inability to work,
there is no sound basis for a distinction which allows further payments
in one situation and not in the other. The ultimate question to be
resolved is whether the injured workman is able to secure employment, taking into consideration his particular training, ability and
previous employment. It is suggested that those jurisdictions which
automatically deny further compensation in such situations should,
in light of the present decision, re-evaluate their position and adopt
fund simply insures that the injured employee will receive the full disability benefits but reimburses the employer for the difference he is required
to pay over and above the apportioned amount. 2 LARsoN, WORKME'S COmPENSATION LAw §§ 59.10, 59.31-.34 (1952).
8. 211 Mich. 260, 178 N.W. 675 (1920).

9. The court discusses at length the problem as to judicial self-correction
and concludes that when a question of statutory interpretation is before the
court, the tribunal should correct previous errors itself rather than await action by a legislature which is quite possibly not apprised of the situation
anyway. 85 N.W.2d at 103, 107.
10. For a complete summary of schedule benefits in this country, see 2
LARSON, Woma
xN's
CoMPENSATiON LAw 536 (1952). This table shows that
several states have provisions which provide that schedule payments are exclusive or are in lieu of all other benefits. Therefore, if the courts in jurisdictions having "in lieu of" provisions construe the statute strictly, then the
problem of the instant case would not arise. See also Annot., 88 A.L.R. 385
(1934).

11. 2 LARSON, WoaxMAEN's COMPENSATION LAw 524 (1952). This section shows
the minimum and maximum amount of payments in all the American jurisdictions.
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the more liberal view, which allows total disability payments even
though the schedule payments have been exhausted. 12
12. Cox v. Black Diamond Coal Mining Co., 93 F. Supp. 685 (E.D. Tenn.
1950), which relied on Johnson v. Anderson, 188 Tenn. 194, 217 S.W.2d 939
(1949).

